Drony mordulce będą latać nad USA

pawel-l

Ⓐ hultaj
1 893
7 616
Chcemy być pionierami
Chyba nie zdążą:
Dubai to Launch Self-Flying Air Taxi by July
Dubai officials say they plan to use Chinese-made drones to launch a self-flying air taxi as soon as July.

The Chinese-made EHang 184 drone has four propeller wings. It is designed to carry one passenger - weighing up to 100 kilograms - and a small piece of luggage.

The head of Dubai’s Roads and Transportation Authority says the autonomous taxi has already been tested in the city-state. He said regular service is expected to begin by July.

The egg-shaped aircraft can reach a top speed of 160 kilometers per hour. It can operate for up to 30 minutes on a single battery charge, with a flying range of 50 kilometers.

Officials in Dubai have not outlined special regulations for the air taxi system. Currently, people who operate drones are required to register the aircraft.
 

Doman

Well-Known Member
1 221
4 021
Idea człekokształtnych mechów jest tak głupia i z punktu widzenia mechaniki i sztuki wojennej tak niewydajna, że jeśli ktoś to zbuduje, to będzie to rząd.
Możesz rozwinąć myśl czemu? Czy dla człowieka bardzie optymalnie byłoby posiadać 4 nogi albo 6 albo ... (kurde, znów ta ludzka stonoga ;) )? Myślę, że człekokształtny robot ma większy wpływ psychologiczny niż robot wyglądający jak
Dla człowieka ( a już tym bardziej dla np. stepowego konia) najoptymalniej byłoby posiadać kółka, bo poruszanie się na kołach jest znacznie mniej energochłonne niż poruszanie się jak zwykłe organizmy lądowe

W trudnym terenie to akurat kółka mogą być nieprzydatne. Ja bym zwrócił uwagę na aspekt wielkości mechów. One są niepotrzebnie wysokie, widać je z daleka, wystawiają się na cel. Lubię klimaty Warhammera 40K itp. ale mechy to faktycznie głupia idea. Współczesne czołgi projektuje się tak by nie wystawały niepotrzebnie nad ziemię, a tu miałby powstać regres?
Ja widzę tylko jedno zastosowanie dla mechów. Cofnąć się w czasie i podać w Starożytności za boga. Mech wzbudzi większy szacunek niż czołg :D. Efektywność nie idzie niestety z efektwonością. Jak wygląda dowódca klasycznego czołgu na wieżyczce? Jak Władca. Hans w Tgrysie jadący na Kursk. Władca. A teraz zobaczcie Igora w T14 gdzie wieża jest bezzałogowa. Igor wygląda jak dupa zza krzaka.
 

NoahWatson

vaxinista
1 171
2 870
Connecticut may become first U.S. state to allow deadly police drones

Connecticut would become the first U.S. state to allow law enforcement agencies to use drones equipped with deadly weapons if a bill opposed by civil libertarians becomes law.
The legislation, approved overwhelmingly by the state legislature's judiciary committee on Wednesday, would ban so-called weaponized drones in the state but exempts agencies involved in law enforcement. It now goes to the House of Representatives for consideration.
The legislation was introduced as a complete ban on weaponized drones but just before the committee vote it was amended to exclude police from the restriction.
Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy, a Democrat, was reviewing the proposal, "however in previous years he has not supported this concept," spokesman Chris Collibee wrote in an email.
Civil libertarians and civil rights activists are lobbying to restore the bill to its original language before the full House vote.
 
OP
OP
kr2y510

kr2y510

konfederata targowicki
12 539
23 880
Chińskie drony, które w przyszłości mają być dronami wojskowymi, latają sobie nad Chinami. Na razie Chińczycy ustanowili rekord, nad Chinami latało sobie stadko 119 dronów i wykonywało zadania. Drony komunikowały się ze sobą (sieć mesh lub jak kto woli kratowa) i miały świadomość pozycji sąsiadów.
 

Pestek

Well-Known Member
688
1 855
Przypominają mi się wrony Saurona z LoTR :) W rękach rządu to może być kolejny poziom w inwigilacji.
Jestem ciekawy jak to wpływa na żywe ptaki. Czy widzą w nich konkurencje i zagrożenie, czy po prostu obiekty martwe w powietrzu?
 

FatBantha

sprzedawca niszowych etosów
Członek Załogi
8 502
24 106
GPS dla każdego: terroryści zaatakowali bazę lotniczą rojem dronów-bombowców
11.01.2018 14:51
Trwająca wciąż w Syrii wojna domowa dobrze pokazuje, że we współczesnych konfliktach zbrojnych obok siebie występować może sprzęt i uzbrojenie, które dzielą całe dekady. Z jednej strony walczący używają pamiętających jeszcze I Wojnę Światową karabinów maszynowych Maxim. Z drugiej nie zdziwmy się, jeśli partyzanci użyją roju załadowanych materiałami wybuchowymi dronów, sterowanych za pomocą „zaawansowanej elektroniki”, z nowoczesnymi odbiornikami GPS. Taki właśnie atak, po raz pierwszy na świecie, przeprowadzony miał zostać przez jedną z antyrządowych grup przeciwko rosyjskim bazom w Syrii.

Rosyjskie ministerstwo obrony poinformowało, że nocą z 5 na 6 stycznia br. systemy radarowe wychwyciły 13 niewielkich obiektów latających nieznanego pochodzenia. 10 z nich zbliżało się po trajektorii prowadzącej do bazy lotniczej Humajmim, trzy odłączyły w stronę bazy zaopatrzenia w mieście Tartus.

Obrona bazy podobno zdała egzamin. Sześć dronów zostało przechwyconych przez systemy walki radioelektronicznej (prawdopodobnie te słynne Krasuchy-4), z czego trzy zostały zmuszone do lądowania na kontrolowanym terytorium poza bazą, a trzy zniszczone wskutek zderzenia z ziemią. Pozostałą siódemką zajął się system obrony przeciwlotniczej Pancyr-S1, zestrzeliwując je wszystkie.



Najwyraźniej więc Rosjanom wpadły w ręce trzy wykorzystane w ataku drony – i już teraz przedstawiają pierwsze wnioski na temat tego pierwszego realnego użycia takiej broni. Najciekawszy jest zasięg użytych dronów: po odczytaniu ich zapisów nawigacyjnych okazuje się, że wszystkie obiekty miały wystartować z lokalizacji oddalonej co najmniej 50 km od ich celu, a według Rosjan, ich maksymalny zasięg wynosił 100 kilometrów.



Wszystkie drony napędzane były śmigłowo, miały też mieć nowoczesne, dostarczone spoza Syrii systemy sterowania i nawigacji, czujniki wysokości i serwomechanizmy. Co warte podkreślenia, najwyraźniej nie były to drony „kamikadze”, lecz raczej lekkie bombowce, załadowane przeznaczonymi do zrzutu we wskazanym miejscu bombami samodzielnej konstrukcji. Ponownie jednak Rosjanie zwracają uwagę na zagraniczne pochodzenie zapalników bomb.



Rosyjskie ministerstwo obrony ogłosiło też, że prowadzi śledztwo mające ustalić, w jaki sposób terroryści uzyskali dostęp do takich technologii i urządzeń. Odpowiedź na to pytanie jest jednak wtórna. Jeśli w rękach grup uczestniczących w wojnie domowej w Syrii znalazła się tego typu broń, to można śmiało założyć, że wkrótce podobne systemy pojawią się w rękach komórek terrorystycznych operujących np. w Europie. Nie trzeba drogich kwadro- czy oktokopterów, taką konstrukcję z silnikiem spalinowym można zrobić ze sklejki.

Łatwo sobie wyobrazić, jak katastrofalne byłyby konsekwencje ataku takiego zmilitaryzowanego drona na cywilny, najpewniej przecież nie chroniony systemami walki radioelektronicznej, a tym bardziej obrony przeciwlotniczej. Możemy mieć tylko nadzieję, że nigdy nie usłyszymy modulowanego przez trzy minuty dźwięku syreny, zapowiadającego alarm powietrzny – w większości państw Europy nie tylko nie ma co liczyć na sprawną obronę przeciwlotniczą, ale też nie bardzo wiadomo, gdzie jest najbliższy schron, i kto ma do niego klucze.
Skoro tak, to teraz pójdzie ban na wszelkie drony. I wprowadzi się obowiązek wyrabiania licencji i pozwolenia.
 
OP
OP
kr2y510

kr2y510

konfederata targowicki
12 539
23 880
Ostatnia edycja:

tosiabunio

Grand Master Architect
Członek Załogi
6 901
14 604
Przecież ten dron wygląda jak taki typowy dron zabawkowy ze sklepu. Gdzie tu sensacja? Że ludzie latają dronami w dziwnych miejscach? Przecież to nie był Predator wyposażony w pociski Hellfire.
 
OP
OP
kr2y510

kr2y510

konfederata targowicki
12 539
23 880
Departament Spraw Wewnętrznych USA uziemił wszystkie chińskie drony, będące jego własnością. Te drony służą głównie do walk z pożarami i powodziami. Względy kontrwywiadowcze. Amerykanie teraz nagle się połapali i się boją.
Dokładniej to uziemiono nie tylko chińskie drony, ale wszystkie drony zawierające jakiekolwiek chińskie komponenty.
 

FatBantha

sprzedawca niszowych etosów
Członek Załogi
8 502
24 106
Wojna ormiańsko-azerska została wykorzystana, jak to zwykle bywa, do sprawdzenia nowych technik walki i wykorzystania nowinek w uzbrojeniu. Ławice dronów mają zastąpić czołgi.


The Turkish military reportedly plans to buy more than 500 quad-copter-type Kargu series loitering munitions, or suicide drones, in the near term. The Kargus, at present, can operate in semi-autonomous or manually-controlled modes, but work is underway to give up to 20 of them the ability to carry out mass attacks as a swarm, which could give Turkey's troops a potentially game-changing new capability.
Turkey's state-run Anadolu Agency news outlet first reported that Defense Technologies Engineering and Trade Inc., also known by its Turkish acronym STM, was expecting to deliver the hundreds of drones to the Turkish armed forces on June 15, 2020. It's not clear if this total order for "over 500" of the drones includes or is in addition to a purchase agreement for 356 Kargus that the Turkish government itself announced in January.
STM introduced the first generation Kargu in 2017 and the Turkish military first began receiving small numbers of the improved Kargu-2 variant last year. Turkish forces have reportedly at least deployed, if not employed, the drones during operations along the country's border with Syria last year.
The manufacturer says that Kargu, a name that literally translates as "hawk" in Turkish, and which is also used to refer to small mountain watchtowers, "has been engineered specifically for anti-terror and asymmetric warfare scenarios." The 15-pound Kargu-2 can fly at up to 90 miles per hour and can remain airborne for up to 30 minutes. It has a line-of-sight control link with a range of around six miles.

The Kargu-2 can also fly higher, has a longer range, and has the ability to remain in a designated area for a longer period of time compared to the earlier models. It also has updated targeting capabilities and improvements to reduce its auditory signature, the latter of which helps reduce the chance that an opponent will spot the drone before it's too late.
An operator on the ground can manually control any of the Kargu series drones and use their onboard sensors, which includes electro-optical and infrared video cameras and a laser imaging system, or LIDAR, to conduct general surveillance and identify and track targets. They can then direct the quad-copters to attack a designated threat, even if it's on the move. The loitering munitions can also safely return to their operators for re-use if no targets are found.
The drones can carry one of three different types of warheads, including a high-explosive fragmentation one for engaging personnel and other unarmored targets in the open, a thermobaric type good for targets in confined spaces such as buildings or caves, and a shaped charge for attacking lightly armored threats. Each one weighs around three pounds. The drone's warhead can also be set to function on impact or airburst above the target, the latter being a feature particularly useful for the fragmentation and thermobaric types.
The operator can also employ the Kargus as a traditional missile against fixed targets. In this method of attack, the drone would use its GPS navigation system to strike the desired location.
The Kargu series of drones can also operate in a semi-autonomous mode, wherein the operator directs the quad-copter to fly to a certain area and then detect and engage targets on its own. As long as the line-of-sight control link remains unbroke, the operator remains in-the-loop throughout the process and can redirect the drone or abort its attack, if necessary. Israel has long been a pioneer of these kinds of man-in-the-loop control systems, which are now the default for most suicide drones and have become increasingly popular on other types of munitions, as well.
Most importantly, however, last year, STM announced it was working to give the Kargu family of drones additional autonomy and the ability to work together in large swarms. The swarming technology is in development as part of a larger Turkish government program known as Kerkes, which is also looking to develop systems to improve the ability of drones to operate in GPS-denied environments, something that is increasingly a very real threat.


It's not clear how heavily networked together the company is expecting to make the armed quad-copters, but even being able to launch more rudimentary massed attacks with up to 20 of them at a time would offer a significant boost in capability.
Tests have shown that a single Kargu with the air-bursting high-explosive fragmentation warhead can effectively engage clusters of personnel within a circle around 20 feet in diameter. More than one working together could evenly engage threats across a relatively wide area. Beyond just being devastating to concentrations of personnel, this could enable quick large scale attacks against other soft targets, including convoys of light vehicles, parked aircraft, radar dishes and sensor systems, ammunition and fuel dumps, and much more. With a mixture of the different warhead options presently available for Kargu, a group of the drones might be able to carry out more complex attacks, as well.
If the swarming Kargus have the ability to operate in a fully-autonomous mode, within pre-set parameters, they could become even more capable. Swarms by their very nature can confuse and overwhelm an opponent's defenses, even those belonging to major militaries, causing havoc even if a significant number of them get shot down before they can reach their targets. This is a very real threat that War Zone has explored in detail on multiple occasions in the past.
Based on its general size and configuration, the Kargus appear to be a relatively low-cost option for providing this capability, which also underscores how low the barrier to entry for this kind of swarming technology is becoming. Beyond more robust military developments with regards to swarming, small quad-copter-type drones flying in large coordinated formations have been employed in the commercial sector for years now, as well.
The swarming technology STM is developing may also be applicable to other drones and loitering munitions it is developing now. Among its other products, the company also offers a fixed-wing tube-launched loitering munition, called Alpagu, which is very similar in form and function to AeroVironment's Switchblade and is now also in Turkish service.

It seems very possible that, in addition to providing these improved Kargus to the Turkish armed forces, STM could also seek to export them, proliferating this capability further around the world. STM has already said that it has received serious inquires about the Kargu series from at least three unnamed potential foreign customers. Turkey, as a whole, has become a powerhouse of drone development and production, employing larger types to great effect in Syria and Libya just this year.
This is precisely the type of weapon we have been warning about for years now. The fact that it is already here and potentially exportable should be yet another wake-up call to the level of threat low-end drones pose to U.S. and allied forces, as well as domestic infrastructure and VIPs.
"I argue all the time with my Air Force friends that the future of flight is vertical and it's unmanned," U.S. Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, said at an event hosted by the Middle East Institute last week. "I'm not talking about large unmanned platforms, which are the size of a conventional fighter jet that we can see and deal with, as we would any other platform."
"I'm talking about the one you can go out and buy at Costco right now in the United States for a thousand dollars, four quad, rotorcraft or something like that that can be launched and flown," he continued. "And with very simple modifications, it can make made into something that can drop a weapon like a hand grenade or something else."
The Kargus, and their future swarming capabilities, could very well become the next major Turkish drone success story, for better or worse.

Scott Ritter
is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer and author of 'SCORPION KING: America's Suicidal Embrace of Nuclear Weapons from FDR to Trump.' He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector. Follow him on Twitter @RealScottRitter
29 Nov, 2020 12:00
From Syria to Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh, this new method of military offense has been brutally effective. We are witnessing a revolution in the history of warfare, one that is causing panic, particularly in Europe.
In an analysis written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Gustav Gressel, a senior policy fellow, argues that the extensive (and successful) use of military drones by Azerbaijan in its recent conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh holds “distinct lessons for how well Europe can defend itself.”
Gressel warns that Europe would be doing itself a disservice if it simply dismissed the Nagorno-Karabakh fighting as “a minor war between poor countries.” In this, Gressel is correct – the military defeat inflicted on Armenia by Azerbaijan was not a fluke, but rather a manifestation of the perfection of the art of drone warfare by Baku’s major ally in the fighting, Turkey. Gressel’s conclusion – that “most of the [European Union’s] armies… would do as miserably as the Armenian Army” when faced by such a threat – is spot on.
What happened to the Armenian Army in its short but brutal 44-day war with Azerbaijan goes beyond simply losing a war. It was more about the way Armenia lost and, more specifically, how it lost. What happened over the skies of Nagorno-Karabakh – where Azerbaijan employed a host of Turkish- and Israeli-made drones not only to surveil and target Armenian positions, but shape and dominate the battlefield throughout – can be likened to a revolution in military affairs. One akin to the arrival of tanks, mechanised armoured vehicles, and aircraft in the early 20th century, that eventually led to the demise of horse-mounted cavalry.
It’s not that the Armenian soldiers were not brave, or well-trained and equipped – they were. It was that they were fighting a kind of war which had been overtaken by technology, where no matter how resolute and courageous they were in the face of the enemy, the outcome was preordained – their inevitable death, and the destruction of their equipment; some 2,425 Armenian soldiers lost their lives in the fighting, and 185 T-72 tanks, 90 armored fighting vehicles, 182 artillery pieces, 73 multiple rocket launchers, and 26 surface-to-air missile systems were destroyed.

A new kind of warfare

What happened to Armenia was not an isolated moment in military history, but rather the culmination of a new kind of warfare, centered on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones). Azerbaijan’s major ally in the war against Armenia – Turkey – has been perfecting the art of drone warfare for years, with extensive experience in full-scale modern conflict gained in recent fighting in Syria (February-March 2020) and Libya (May-June 2020.)
Over the course of the past decade, Turkey has taken advantage of arms embargoes imposed by America and others which restricted Ankara’s access to the kind of front-line drones used by the US around the world, to instead build from scratch an indigenous drone-manufacturing base. While Turkey has developed several drones in various configurations, two have stood out in particular – the Anka-S and Bayraktar.
While the popular term for the kind of drone-centric combat carried out by Turkey is drone swarm,” the reality is that modern drone warfare, when conducted on a large scale, is a deliberate, highly coordinated process which integrates electronic warfare, reconnaissance and surveillance, and weapons delivery. Turkey’s drone war over Syria was managed from the Turkish Second Army Command Tactical Command Center, located some 400km away from the fighting in the city of Malatya in Turkey’s Hatay Province.
It was here that the Turkish drone operators sat, and where they oversaw the operation of an integrated electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) warfare capability designed to jam Syrian and Russia air-defense radars and collect signals of military value (such as cell phone conversations) which were used to target specific locations.

For every $1 in losses suffered by Turkey, Syria lost approximately $5

The major systems used by Turkey in this role are the KORAL jamming system and a specially configured Anka-S drone operating as an airborne intelligence collection platform. The Anka-S also operated as an airborne command and control system, relaying targeting intelligence to orbiting Bayraktar UAVs, which would then acquire the target visually before firing highly precise onboard air-to-surface rockets, destroying the target. When conducted in isolation, an integrated drone strike such as those carried out by Turkey can be deadly effective; when conducted simultaneously with four or more systems in action, each of which is capable of targeting multiple locations, the results are devastating and, from the perspective of those on the receiving end, might be likened to a deadly “swarm.”
The fighting in Syria illustrated another important factor regarding drone warfare – the disparity of costs between the drone and the military assets it can destroy. Turkish Bayraktar and Anka-S UAV’s cost approximately $2.5 million each. Over the course of fighting in Syria’s Idlib province, Turkey lost between six and eight UAVs, for a total replacement cost of around $20 million.
In the first night of fighting in Syria, Turkey claims (and Russia does not dispute) that it destroyed large numbers of heavy equipment belonging to the Syrian Army, including 23 tanks and 23 artillery pieces. Overall, Turkish drones are credited with killing 34 Syrian tanks and 36 artillery systems, along with a significant amount of other combat equipment. If one uses the average cost of a Russian-made tank at around $1.2 million, and an artillery system at around $500,000, the total damage done by Turkey’s drones amounts to some $57.3 million (and this number does not include the other considerable material losses suffered by the Syrian military, which in total could easily match or exceed that number.) From a cost perspective alone, for every $1 in losses suffered by Turkey, the Syrians lost approximately $5.
Turkey was able to take the lessons learned from the fighting in Idlib province and apply them to a different theater of war, in Libya, in May 2020. There, Turkey had sided with the beleaguered forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which was mounting what amounted to a last stand around the Libyan capital of Tripoli. The GNA was facing off against the forces of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), based out of Benghazi, which had launched a major offensive designed to capture the capital, eliminate the GNA, and take control of all of Libya.

How to capture half a country

The LNA was supported by the several foreign powers, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia (via Wagner Group, a private military contractor.) Turkey’s intervention placed a heavy emphasis on the integrated drone warfare it had perfected in Syria. In Libya, the results were even more lop-sided, with the Turkish-backed GNA able to drive the LNA forces back, capturing nearly half of Libya in the process.
Both the LNA and Turkish-backed GNA made extensive use of combat drones, but only Turkey brought with it an integrated approach to drone warfare. Observers have grown accustomed to the concept of individual US drones operating freely over places such as Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, delivering precision strikes against terrorist targets. However, as Iran demonstrated this past May, drones are vulnerable to modern air-defense systems, and US drone tactics would not work over contested airspace.
Likewise, the LNA, which made extensive use of Chinese-made combat drones flown by UAE pilots, enjoyed great success until Turkey intervened. Its electronic warfare and integrated air-defense capabilities then made LNA drone operations impossible to conduct, and the inability of the LNA to field an effective defense against the Turkish drone operations resulted in the tide of battle rapidly shifting on the ground. If anything, the cost differential between the Turkish-backed GNA and the LNA was greater than the $1-to-$5 advantage enjoyed by Turkey in Syria.

The big players – the US, Russia & China – are playing catch-up

By the time Turkey began cooperating with Azerbaijan against Armenia in September 2020, Turkish drone warfare had reached its zenith, and the outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh was all but assured. One of the main lessons drawn from the Turkish drone experiences in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh is that these conflicts were not fought against so-called “poor countries.”
Rather, the Turks were facing off against well-equipped and well-trained forces operating equipment which closely parallels that found in most small- and medium-sized European countries. Indeed, in all three conflicts, Turkey was facing off against some of the best anti-aircraft missile defenses produced by Russia. The reality is that most nations, if confronted by a Turkish “drone swarm,” would not fare well.
And the multiple deployment of drones is only going to expand. The US Army is currently working on what it calls the “Armed, Fully-Autonomous Drone Swarm,” or AFADS. When employed, AFADS will – autonomously, without human intervention – locate, identify, and attack targets using what is known as a “Cluster Unmanned Airborne System Smart Munition,” which will dispense a swarm of small drones that fan out over the battlefield to locate and destroy targets.
China has likewise tested a system that deploys up to 200 “suicide drones” designed to saturate a battlespace and destroy targets by flying into them. And this past September, the Russian military integrated“drone-swarm” capabilities for the first time in a large-scale military exercise.
The face of modern warfare has been forever altered, and those nations that are not prepared or equipped to fight in a battlefield where drone technology is fully incorporated in every aspect of the fight can expect outcomes similar to that of Armenia: severe losses of men and equipment, defeat, humiliation and the likely loss of their territory. This is the reality of modern warfare which, as Gustav Gressel notes, should make any nation not fully vested in drone technology “think – and worry.”
 
Do góry Bottom